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SCHAUER, J.-I concur. I think it should be mentioned,
however, that although in seeking prohibition petitioner appears to have mistaken his remedy, the denial of the petition
is without prejudice, and is completely unrelated, to a possible
remedy by motion in the trial court to dismiss the action on
the ground that the facts bring the case within the provisions
of section 581a of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Such facts, as related in the main opinion, show that more
than three years elapsed between the time the action was filed
against petitioner (defendant in such action) and the time
summons was served on him, and also that he remained a
resident of California for more than three years after the
action was filed. Under such circumstances, in the absence of
a showing of facts suspending operation of the statute, it
would seem to be the duty of the court on motion of the petitioner or of its own motion to dismiss the main action.

[L.A. No. 22189.

In Bank.

Aug. 11, 1953.]

Estate of RUBY SARGAV AK, Deceased. H. KURKJIAN
et al., Appellants, v. J. G. OHANNESON et al., Respondents.
[1] Appeal-Law of Case-Probate Matters.-Although Supreme
Court, on former appeal, affirmed order admitting a holographic
instrument to probate as a codicil to a previously admitted
witnessed will, such decision is not the law of the case in subsequent proceedings to determine heirship where opinion of
Supreme Court, on former appeal, expressly stated that court
was concerned only with question of whether codicil was intended as a testamentary document and not with meaning of
instrument, whereas court in present proceedings is concerned
with the meaning, namely, whether there was an intent to
create a trust.
[2] Wills-Estates or Interests Devised-Trusts.-To impose a
trust on property bequeathed it must appear that testator
intended to impose mandatory duties.
[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, § 706; Am.Jur., Appeal
and Error, § 985 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Appeal and Error, § 1348; [2] Wills,
§377; [3] Wills, §370; [4] Wills, §202; [5] Wills, §274; [6]
Wills, §§273, 274; [7] Wills, §294; [8] Wills, §292(6); [9]
Trusts, § 142; [10] Trusts, § 291.
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[4]

[5)

[7]

[8]

(9]

!d.-Estates or Interests Devised-Later Words as Limiting
Gifts Made.-vVhere an absolute estate has been devised by
will, that estate will not be limited by subsequent words unless
they indicate as clear an intention therefor as was shown by
words creating the estate. (Prob. Code, § 104.)
Id.- Testamentary Writings- Showing of Intent.- While
declarations of testator before and after execution of will are
admissible for purpose of ascertaining intent with which instrument was executed, they are not admissible for purpose
of proving the meaning testator attributed to specific provisions of admitted will.
Id.- Construction- Consideration of Surrounding Circumstances.-In case of uncertainty arising on face of will, the
trier of fact may consider such matters as size of estate, property involved in gift, circumstances of the parties and their
relation to each other and to testator.
Id.- Construction- Intention of Testator.-When an uncertainty arises on face of a will as to meaning of any of its
provisions, testator's intent is to be ascertained from words
of will, but circumstances of its execution may be taken into
consideration, excluding oral declarations of testator as to his
intentions.
!d.-Construction-Extrinsic Bvidence.-A holographic instrument admitted to probate as a codicil to a witnessPd will and
stating that writer is acting of her own free will and that she
"leaves everything she has" to her "boy" and her lawyer, gives
them power of attorney to divide what is left of her belongings
"to them," and wants it understood that a certain named
woman is to have nothing, is positive and unequivocal, and
extrinsic evidence is not admissible to show a trust.
!d.-Construction-Mandatory and Precatory Words.-Where
the person directed to carry out testator's wishes is both executor and legatee, the strict rule which imposes a mandatory duty
on executor is not followed and the words are treated as being
addressed to him in his capacity as legatee.
Trusts-Constructive Trusts-Breach of Agreement by Devisee
or Legatee.-Where testator devises or bequeaths property to
a person in reliance on his agreement to hold the property in
trust, the devisee or legatee holds the property on a constructive trust for the person for whom he agreed to hold it.

[4] See Cal.Jur., Wills, § 186 et seq.; Am.Jur., Wills, § 8 et seq.
[9] Devise or legacy on promise of devisee or legatee that another shall benefit as creating trust, note, 66 A.L.R. 156. See, also,
Cal.Jur., Trusts, § 45.
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[10] !d.-Actions to Establish-Jurisdiction.-Probate court is not
the appropriate forum in which to establish a constructive
trust; it must be litigated in an independent proceeding in
equity.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County determining heirship. Joseph W. Vickers,
,Judge. Affirmed.
Cameron & Perkins, William Kinley, Simpson & \Vise aml
George E. Wise for Appellants.
C. vV. Byrer, Charles E. Hobart, Robert M. Dulin, Spurgeon
Avakian and Melvin E. :B1 ink for Respondents.
CAHTER, J.-'l1 his is an appeal from an order in proceedings to determine heirship in the estate of Ruby Sargavak,
deceased, initiated by nephews and nieces, the only heirs of
Mrs. Sargavak. J. G. Ohanneson and Samuel G. Mahdesian,
the legatees in the codicil later mentioned, were declared by
the order to be entitled to the entire estate under the codicil.
" It appears that in 1945 Mrs. Sargavak made a witnessed
will in which she named her heirs as legatees and Mahdesian
as executor. That will was admitted to probate and a contest
filed on the ground of mental incapacity. Following a verdict
for contestants the probate court granted to proponents a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. That judgment was
reversed on appeal (Estate of Sargavak, 95 Cal.App.2d 73
[212 P.2d 541]) and judgment entered on the verdict. The
trial court then granted a motion for a new trial, and apparently that proceeding has not progressed beyond that
stage.
Shortly after the 1945 will was offered for probate a holographic instrument, dated September 29, 1946, was offered
for probate as a codicil to the 1945 will. It reads:
"1566 W-29th St.
Los Angeles 7, Cal.
Sep 29, 1946
Sunday Evening
"To vVHOM IT MAY CoNCERN:

''I the writer-Mrs. Ruby Sargavak wants everyone to know
that she is writing these lines of her own free will-no one
is putting her ef or urging her to do it. She leaves everything she has to her Boy Sam Mahdesian & her layer, J. G.
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Ohanneson-she gives them power of attorney to divide what
is left of her belongings to them. She specifically advises to
give nothing what so ever to Mrs. Lillian Shooshan-she is no
relation nor friend of hers-Mrs. Sargavak has been more than
kind to her, just because she begged us to help her for a little
time-Mrs. Sargavak would rather help her very own nieces
& grand nieces & perfect strangers, who are truly in need of
help. God has been good to us, she did not appreciate the
goodness of the Lord to her. All honor & glory unto his High
and Holy Name! Mrs. Ruby Sargavak. P. S. It is 8 o'clock,
I am very tired-Ruby Sargavak."
Its probate was contested by Mrs. Sargavak's heirs on the
ground that she did not intend it as testamentary disposition
of her property. Extrinsic evidence was received on that
question and it was ordered admitted to probate. On appeal
it was claimed that the evidence without contradiction showed
no testamentary intent and also that extrinsic evidence was
not admissible. The order was affirmed, this court stating
that "we are here concerned not with the meaning of the
instrument (codicil), but with the intention with which it
1vas executed.'' (Estate of Sargavak, 35 Cal.2d 93, 96 [216
P.2cl850, 21 .A.L.R.2d 307] .) We held that extrinsic evidence
was admissible to show whether the testator intended the
codicil to be effective.
In the instant heirship proceedings initiated by decedent's
heirs the latter asserted that it was her intent by the codicil
that the property go to Ohanneson and Mahdesian in trust for
persons other than Mrs. Shooshan and that they have power
of attomey to divide it between the other persons, but as the
beneficiaries of the trust were uncertain (the claimed beneficiaries being decedent's nieces and nephews and strangers)
the trnst failed and the property would pass by intestate
succession to the heirs. The court refused to permit the heirs
to introouce any extrinsic evidence to show that the intent
was that claimed by them and determined that Ohanneson
and Mahdesian took the property absolutely, and that no trust
was intended by the codicil.
'J'be heirs, petitioners in the heirship proceedings, assert
error, claiming that the codicil was ambiguous on its face and
extrinsic evidence was admissible to show a trust. In this
eonnection they contend that this court's decision in the
former appeal ( h-:sta.te of Sargavak, supra, 35 Cal.2d 93)
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established that such evidence was admissible. The extrinsic
evidence sought to be introduced by petitioners consisted of
the circumstances surrounding the making of the will such
as the size of the estate, the property involved and the circumstances and relations of the parties involved; and oral
declarations of the testatrix such as were mentioned in Estate
of Sargavak, s1tpra, 35 Cal.2d 93, including her statement to
Mahdesian in referring to the codicil-that she wanted Ohanneson, her attorney, and him, as her executor, to take care of
her estate the way he knew she wanted it.
[1] Referring to the last contention first (the effect of
the decision in the former appeal on this case), it is clear that
the decision on the former appeal has no bearing upon the
present case. As above mentioned it was there expressly stated
in the forepart of the opinion that the court was concerned
only with the question of whether the codicil was intended as
a testamentary document and not with the meaning of the
instrument. Here we are concerned with the meaningwhether there was an intent to create a trust. It is true, as
stated by Ohanneson and Mahdesian, that we there said, in
discussing the evidence on the question of testamentary intent, that nothing indicated an intent that decedent did not
leave the property to those persons, that there was evidence
of such intent because of the close association between decedent and them and that the purpose to leave her property to
them was expressed by the instrument. But that discussion
was aimed solely at the question of whether she intended to
make a will and not as to the meaning of the will-as to
whether their interest should be absolute. The only thing
before the court was whether the codicil was a will and no
question of construction was involved. (See Estate of Salmonski, 38 Cal.2d 199 [238 P.2d 966].)
The statutes on the subject of the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in the construction of wills provide : ''A clear
and distinct devise or bequest cannot be affected by any
reasons assigned therefor, or by any other words not equally
clear and distinct, or by inference or argument from other
parts of the will, or by an inaccurate recital of or reference
to its contents in another part of the will.'' (Prob. Code,
§ 104.) "\Vhen there is an imperfect description, or no person
or property exactly answers the description, mistakes and
omissions must be corrected, if the error appears from the
context of the will or from extrinsic evidence, excluding the
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oral declarations of the testator as to his intentions; and
when an uncertainty arises upon the face of a will, as to the
application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention
is to be ascertained from the words of the will, taking into
view the circumstances under which it was made, excluding
such oral declarations." (Prob. Code, § 105.) Recently this
court has stated the rules of construction and on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence. [2, 3] To impose a trust
upon property bequeathed it must appear that the testator
intended to impose mandatory duties, and where an absolute
estate has been devised by will, that estate will not be limited
by subsequent words unless they indicate as clear an intention therefor as was shown by the words creating the estate
(Estate of Collias, 37 Cal.2d 587 [233 P.2d 554]; Estate of
](earns, 36 Cal.2d 531 [225 P.2d 218] ; Prob. Code, § 104,
s1tpra). [4] While declarations of the testator before and
after the execution of the will are admissible for the purpose
of ascertaining the intent with which the instrument was
executed, they are not admissible ''for the purpose of proving
the meaning the testator attributed to specific provisions of
the admitted will. [Citations.] 'Such . . . declarations of intent to make a will are admissible when the attempt is not to
explain an ambiguity but to show the testamentary character
of a letter.' " (Estate of Sargavak, supra, 35 Cal.2d 93, 97.)
In Estate of Kearns, s11pra,, 36 Cal.2d 531, the court was considering whether a clear dispositive clause of a will was
modified by a later clause which seemed to indicate, by
allegedly precatory words, the creation of a trust. We concluded that the later clause was not as clear as the dispositive
clause and hence under section 104 of the Probate Code,
supra, a trust was not created unless the intent of the testator
to do so can be shown by extrinsic evidence and ''Section
104 must be read with section 105 of the Probate Code which
provides that 'when an. uncertainty arises upon the face of a
will, as to the application of any of its provisions, the testator's
intention is to be ascertained from the words of the will,
taking into view the circumstances under which it was made,
excluding . . . oral declarations' of the testator as to his
intentions." (Estate of Kearns, supra, 36 Cal.2d 531, 537.)
[5] As there was an "uncertainty" on the face of the will
the trier of fact may consider such matters "as the size of
the estate, the property involved in the gift, the circumstances
of the parties and their relation to each other and to the
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testator.'' In other words, oral declarations of the testator
are not admissible but circumstances may be shown where
there is an uncertainty. [6] Or as was said in Estate of
8almonski, supra, 38 Cal.2d 199, 214: "When an uncertainty
arises upon the face of a will as to the meaning of any of its
provisions, the testator's intent is to be ascertained from the
words of the will, but the circumstances of the execution
thereof may be taken into consideration, excluding the oral
declarations of the testator as to his intentions . . . . But
'where the intent is plain' from the words used, 'the duty of
the court is to declare that intent, without regard to the consequences.' '' As in the Kearns case, the question here presented is whether the testatrix intended to create a trust
rather than an ascertainment of who are the beneficiaries
thereof if one was created, hence it is not a case of determining an ''imperfect description'' or where no ''person exactly
answers the description'' as contemplated by the first clause
of section 105 of the Probate Code, s1tpra. The problem is
whether a trust was intended at all for any beneficiaries, not
who those beneficiaries might be after it has been determined
that a trust was intended. 'fhus it is not a question of ascertaining the objects or property of the testator's bounty, and
cases on that issue relied upon by petitioners are not applicable.
[7] Decisive on the admissibility of extrinsic evidence is,
therefore, the presence or absence of uncertainty in the codicil.
That there is no uncertainty is plain considering the codicil
and rules of construction applicable. The bequest to Mahdesian and Ohanneson, hereafter referred to as legatees, is
positive and unequivocal. 'l'he testatrix declares that she
''leaves everything she has'' to her ''boy'' Mahdesian (he
was not her son) and her lawyer Ohanneson. True, she goes
on to state that she ''gives them power of attorney to divide
what is left of her belongings to them," but the giving of the
power of attorney does not indicate a trust as it is only an
authorization to the legatees to divide the property between
them, merely another way of saying that she leaves it to them
with full power to take charge of it and divide it. It is clear
that when she said she gave power of attorney to ''them''
the "them" referred to the legatees, and it clearly follows
that the second ''them'' in the same clause also refers to the
legatees. There is no relation between that "them" and the
nieces and grandnieces and strangers later mentioned. She
states that Mrs. Shooshan is to be given nothing, undoubtedly
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a possibility that the legatees might give her somean eventuality ·which she wants to avoid because of her
toward Mrs. Shooshan. The references to nieces and
and "perfect" strangers is a further expression
of her dislike for Mrs. Shooshan, it being stated that she would
rather help them than Mrs. Shooshan, indicating that she did
not even see fit to help such persons. ·when she refers to what
js "left of her belongings" she plainly means what is left at
the time she dies or after the creditors and expenses of
administration have been paid.
It is urged that becanse :M:ahdesian was named executor
in the 1945 will (none was named in the codicil) and that will
stands as far as it appoints an executor, a presumption arises
that the bequest to him was intended to be in trust. It is
not known now whether the 1945 will will withstand the
contest as a new trial has been granted and the outcome is not
known as above mentioned. Aside from that, however, the
law is not as claimed by petitioners. Even if :M:ahdesian was
named as executor in the codicil it still appears that he is
clearly made a legatee, and any power of attorney does not appear to be addressed to him as executor. [8] ""Where the person
directed to carry out the wishes of the testator is both executor
and legatee, the courts in construing the effect of the language
have refused to follow the strict rule which imposes a mandatory duty on the executor and have apparently treated the
words as being addressed to him in his capacity as legatee.''
(Estate of J(eat'ns, supra, 36 Cal.2cl531, 534; Estate of Collias,
snpra, 37 Cal.2d 587, 590.)
[9] It may be noted that some of the extrinsic evidence
to which reference is made in Estate of Sargavak, supra, 35
Cal.2cl 93, might indicate that there was an oral agreement between the testatrix and Ohanneson and :M:ahdesian that they
would hold the property received by them under the codicil
for petitioners or some of them. Such an oral agreement
could be proved by extrinsic evidence and a constructive trust
would arise in favor of the beneficiaries, for "\Vhere a testator
devises or bequeaths property to a person in reliance upon
his agreement to hold the property in trust, the devisee or
legatee holds the property upon a constructive trust for the
person for whom he agreed to hold it.'' (Rest., Trusts, § 55;
see Sears v. Rule, 27 Cal.2d 131 [163 P.2d 443] ; Beck v.
West Coast Life Ins. Co., 38 Cal.2d 643 [241 P.2d 544, 26
41 C.2d-11

[ 41 C.2d

322

A.hH.2d 9791; Orella v. Johnson. ~~S Cal.2d 69:1 [242 P.2d
Dl I ; 2:1 CrJl.,J nr.· 177.) [10] '!'he probate court is not, how·ever, the appropriatr formn in which to establish such a
trust; it must be litigated in an independent proceeding in
equity. (Sca1·s v. Rule, supra, 27 Cal.2cll31; Estate of Morelli,
102 Cal.App.2d 39 [226 P.2d 716].) Hence, the question cannot be considered in the instant proceeding.
The order is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer,
.J., and Spence, J., concurred.

[L. A. No. 22222. In Bank. Aug. l"J,, 1953.]

ELBERT, L'rD. (a Corporation), Respondent, v. JOSEPH
l\L GROSS, Appellant.
[1] Streets-Improvement Act of 1911-Sale for Nonpayment of
Bonds-Notice.-In that part of Sts. & Hy. Code, § 6550
(based on Improvement Act of 1911) which, prior to its
amendment in 1950, made service of notice ~upon the owner
of the property purchased, or his agent if he is named in
the certificate of sale" a condition precedent to obtaining a
city treasurer's deed on foreclosure of a street improvement
bond, the fact that the clause "if he is named in the certificate of sale" and the word "agent" both appeared in the same
part of the sentence and were separated from the word
"owner" by a comma shows that the evident purpose of such
punctuation was to limit the qualifying clause to "agent."
[2] Statutes-Construction-Language of Statute.-A limiting
clause in a statute is to be confined to the last antecedent,
unless context or evident meaning of statute requires a
different construction.
[3] Streets-Improvement Act of 1911-Sale for Nonpayment of
Bonds-Notice.-In its original form, Sts. & Hy. Code, § 6550,
required notice to be served on owner of property as prerequisite to validity of city treasurer's deed issued on foreclosure of street improvement bond unless name of owner's
[1] See Cal.Jur., Municipal Corporations, § 708.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 3, 4, 7-9, 11] Streets, § 414(1); [2]
.Statutes, § 125; [5] Statutes, § 73; [6] Statutes, § 191; [10]
Streets, § 414(3); [12] Streets, § 414(2); [13] Appeal and
Error, § 150.

